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PRIVATE INTEREST
SAFEGUARDING PRIVATE INTEREST IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
HENRY WOLF BIKLEt
Administrative procedure suggests procedure before some
tribunal, other than a judicial tribunal, created to promote some
governmental purpose. But it need not be a tribunal: adminis-
trative duties, requiring administrative procedure, may be de-
volved on individual officers of government. By way of illustra-
tion, reference may be made to the authority of the Secretary of
War in the matter of bridges over navigable streams,1 the author-
ity of the Secretary of Agriculture considered in the Morgan
case,2 and the recent transfer to the Secretary of the Interior
of the functions of the Bituminous Coal Commission. 3 Never-
theless, when administrative procedure is discussed, it is believed
to be the general assumption that procedure before an adminis-
trative tribunal, or before a government official functioning in
much the same manner, is what is usually subsumed.
This assumption will be adopted for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, and no attempt will be made to differentiate between
executive and administrative functions. But, as regards the dif-
ference between the judicial and the administrative tribunal, it
seems sufficient at this time to say that the judicial tribunal is
primarily concerned with the enforcement of the law for the
purpose of doing justice according to law, and the administrative
tribunal is primarily concerned with the enforcement of the par-
ticular legislative policy which it is created to carry out.4 This
distinction is believed to be important in considering what ad-
ministrative procedure should be, since it is conceivable that the
administrator, through his daily experience with practical prob-
lems, may become so imbued with what he conceives to be the
legislative purpose that he may overlook or disregard the written
t A.B., Gettysburg College, 1897; A.M., 1900; LL.B., University of Penn-
sylvania, 1901; LL.D., Gettysburg College, 1928. General Counsel of The
Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
1. Union Bridge Co. v. United States (1907) 204 U. S. 364.
2. (1936) 298 U. S. 468; (1938) 304 U. S. 1.
3. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of May 9, 1939, pursuant to the provisions
of the Reorganization Act of 1939 (1939 Supp.) 5 U. S. C. A. sec. 133.
4. Dean Landis suggests the interesting trinity of duties: "to plan, to
promote, and to police." The Administrative Process (1938) 15.
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mandate of the legislature which has undertaken to outline for
him what that purpose is and his relation to it.5 Those who are
clothed with power tend inevitably to seek to expand the field in
which they may exercise it.
Indeed, there are those who seem to avow the theory that the
administrative agency should be imbued with a desire to accom-
plish what it conceives to be the objectives of the statute which
it administers rather than with a desire to do exact justice. Thus
Dean Landis says:
The adequate development of these staffs [administrative
agencies' staffs] would provide judges who have, as they
should have, an understanding of the general policy of the
administrative, indeed a proper bias toward its point of
view, and yet, by having been entirely disassociated with the
earlier phases of the proceeding, have no personal interest
in its outcome.
The accustomed symbol of justice is an imposing figure, blind-
folded, holding a pair of scales evenly balanced: the school of
thought represented by Dean Landis would seem to desire that,
as symbolic of the administrative process, the balance should be
tilted, and the eyes uncovered, carefully watching to see that it
is kept so. This is said, not so much by way of criticism of this
theory, since the effective carrying into execution of policies fre-
quently requires a different mental attitude than the judicial, but
because it has a highly important bearing on the proper relation-
ship of the administrative agency to the courts, and the necessity
for safeguards against an undue bias.
It is important to remember also that there is no recognized
minimum test of fitness to serve on administrative tribunals-
an important difference as contrasted with the requirements of
service on a court. With exceptions so few as to be negligible,
a man must be a member of the bar before he may be a judge,
5. In several cases the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the Interstate Commerce Commission has been guided by its concep-
tion of legislative policy, rather than by the Congressional description of
what was intended. United States v. New York Central R. R. (1924) 263
U. S. 603; United States v. Missouri Pacific R. R. (1929) 278 U. S. 269;
Ann Arbor R. R. v. United States (1930) 281 U. S. 658.
6. The Administrative Process (1938) 103-104. See also the contribu-
tions of Dean Landis and Professor Brown to the Symposium on Adminis-
trative Law, Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Association of American




and this almost everywhere involves some measure of training
for the duties that he will be called upon to perform as judge.
Nothing comparable is found in the case of the administrative
officer. No recognized minimum of competence exists. The only
protection is found in the method of appointment; and this is,
as a rule, not only inadequate, in that it provides no standards
of any kind, but also in that these highly important offices, with
all the power that belongs to them, are made a part of the politi-
cal spoils system. Two results frequently appear: first, men are
selected who have little capacity for the duties they are expected
to perform and who are likely to be superseded as a result of
some political change before they can master the duties of the
office; and, second, men appointed are often influenced by con-
siderations other than a careful regard for the provisions of the
laws that have been enacted for their guidance. This statement
is made with respect to the general situation, and with full recog-
nition of the fact that there are honorable exceptions. But it is
unfortunately a feature of the administrative process that has
a far-reaching bearing on what procedure is essential to protect
the just rights of those who are to be affected by decisions of
administrative officers or tribunals.7
Again, the standards provided for the guidance of the admin-
istrative officer or tribunal are frequently exceedingly vague and
confer a wide range of discretion upon those who are to apply
these standards.8 Take the general standard for the rates of
public utilities-reasonableness. There is some approach to defi-
niteness when the entire rate structure of a water company is
to be considered, although even here the problem of valuation
and the prognosis as to the effect of any particular rate struc-
ture for the coming year give abundance of "elbow room" to the
administrator who wants it. But pass from this illustration to
the question of different classes of rates of a public utility like
a railroad: the coal rates, the grain rates, the rates on bananas,
on ore, on live stock, the passenger fares, and so on. And pass
from these classes of rates to the individual rate, e. g., the rate
on limestone from point A to point B. It is obvious that the
7. Some protection against the results that might otherwise be expected
from these facts is found in the experience developed in the subordinate
officials of the administrative agency, a protection that is enhanced where
they have security of tenure.
8, Cf. Landis, The Administratve Process (1938) 66-67.
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range of discretion in the administrative official is a very wide
one, and frequently affords him an opportunity to do pretty much
what he chooses. Then remember that the issue may mean an
immense sum of money to the railroad that carries the traffic
and may amount almost to a question of success or failure to
the industry involved.
Frequently the importance extends beyond these two immedi-
ate parties to the transaction and affects communities, as is illus-
trated by the long standing controversy over the rates between
the interior and the port cities on the Atlantic seaboard, a con-
troversy that has resulted in many cases before the Interstate
Commerce Commission9 and is apt to result in many more, for it
seems impossible of a solution satisfactory to all concerned.
In view of these considerations, viz., the fact that the admin-
istrative officer or tribunal is primarly entrusted with power to
enforce some governmental policy; that those who are so en-
trusted are subjected to no regime of training to insure their
competence; that they are frequently, if not usually, selected
for political considerations and at times to serve political ends;
that the standards they are to apply are in many instances ex-
tremely vague and permit a wide range of discretion; it seems
obvious that private interests need some safeguards.
In saying this there is no thought of intimating that the admin-
istrative function is to be disparaged or hindered. It is believed,
on the contrary, that it plays a useful and indeed essential part
in our present complicated economic life. But it is said in the
hope that the faults with which its exercise is at present at-
tended may be realized and in due course corrected; and more
immediately because its nature emphasizes the importance of the
administrative procedure which should be followed if private in-
terests are to be reasonably protected.
It is not inappropriate to say at this point that the protection
9. New York Produce Exchange v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. (1898) 7
I. C. C. 612; In the Matter of Differential Freight Rates (1905) 11 I. C. C.
13; Chamber of Commerce of N. Y. v. New York Central & H. R. R. R.(1912) 24 I. C. C. 55; (1912) 24 1. C. C. 674; (1913) 27 I. C. C. 238; In
the Matter of Import Rates (1912) 24 I. C. C. 78; (1912) 24 I. C. C. 678;(1913) 27 I. C. C. 245; The New York Harbor Case (1917) 47 I. C. C. 643;
Maritime Ass'n of Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R. R. (1925)
95 I. C. C. 539; Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R. R. (1929)
159 I. C. C. 691; Lighterage Cases (1934) 203 I. C. C. 481; Albany Port
District Comm'n v. Ahnapee & W. Ry. (1936) 219 I. C. C. 151; Philadelphia
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1938) 231 I. C. C. 21.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/17
PRIVATE INTEREST
of such private interests is not without its public aspect, since
the services rendered by those who are subject to administrative
authority are, for the most part, essential to the public welfare;
and, unless those who now furnish them are given reasonable
protection, capital will cease to flow into such projects, and the
government will perforce find it necessary to assume the respon-
sibility itself. Doubtless to some persons this might be a con-
summation devoutly to be wished, but it would raise two im-
portant questions: first, whether such a change in our methods
would prove compatible with the continuance of our democratic
system of government, and second, whether those who use these
services would be better served and at less charges than they are
now. Fortunately, neither of these questions requires discussion
here.
Turning, then, to the question of the specific procedure which
should attend the exercise of the administrative function if pri-
vate interests are to be adequately safeguarded, it is elementary
that two things are required: (a) a fair and adequate hearing
before the administrative agency, and (b) an opportunity for
judicial determination whether such hearing has been accorded
both in form and in substance, and whether the authority con-
ferred upon the administrative agency has been respected or
exceeded.
At this late date it would hardly seem necessary to argue that
a fair and adequate hearing should be accorded. The old maxim,
"Strike, but hear," is supposed to have its roots in the ancient
East. In one of the old romances of chivalry it is said, "It is
manifest to all who have any knowledge that man or woman are
to be heard, of right, in their own defence, in all cases except
in treason and conspiracy; this is the custom in all lands wherein
justice is observed. ' ,
And Mr. Webster's famous definition in his argument in the
Dartmouth College case has not yet been repudiated:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general
law; a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds
upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."1
10. 2 Lobeira, Amadis of Gaud, 22. Aristophanes, in his Wasps (422 B.
C.) says: "He was right who said: 'Decide nothing till you have heard both
sides'."
11. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 518, at 581-
19401
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And yet, as recently as year before last, the United States
Supreme Court set aside an administrative decison of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture on the ground that it had been reached with-
out a fair hearing.12 The Court said:
* * * The right to a hearing embraces not only the right
to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to
know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.
The right to submit argument implies that opportunity;
otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are
brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial
proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are en-
titled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes
and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final
command. * * *
Congress, in requiring a "full hearing," had regard tojudicial standards,-not in any technical sense but with re-
spect to those fundamental requirements of fairness which
are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial
nature. * * *
The maintenance of proper standards on the part of ad-
ministrative agencies in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions is of the highest importance and in no
way cripples or embarrasses the exercise of their appropri-
ate authority. On the contrary, it is in their manifest inter-
est. For, as we said at the outset, if these multiplying agen-
cies deemed to be necessary in our complex society are to
serve the purposes for which they are created and endowed
with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by acting
in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embody-
ing the basic concepts of fair play.
But little need be added on this point. It is difficult to see
how any one can question the propriety of a clear statement of
what the person subject to the power of the administrative offi-
cial is to answer: without such statement he has no fair chance
to answer. Clearly, also, he should know what is going to be
taken into consideration as evidence when the issue comes to
be decided, as otherwise he has no fair chance to answer it if
he can; and yet, even the Interstate Commerce Commission used
to insist that it was entitled to take into consideration not only
the evidence in the particular case, but the general information
which the Commissioners had accumulated during their years of
experience, especially that contained in their files and records,
12. Morgan v. United States (1938) 304 U. S. 1, 18, 19, 22.
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a position which, of course, was held untenable by the Supreme
Court.13 But, unless its practice has been recently changed, it
still refuses, when its orders are contested in the courts, to cer-
tify that a given set of papers constitutes the proceedings "so
full and entire as they appear on the record" before it: it in-
sists on confining its certification to a statement that certain
papers are correct copies of papers in the case before it-a ves-
tigial reminder of its former theory.
One aspect of the importance of this requirement is in order
that it may be possible to determine precisely what the record
before the administrative agency is, so that it may be ascertained
with accuracy and fairness whether the administrative tribunal
has proceeded in accordance with the authority conferred upon
it by the statute from which it derives its powers, whether it has
issued an order in conformity with the evidence before it, and
whether the hearing it has accorded has been the substance
rather than the shadow of a fair hearing.
It is settled, of course, that the established rules of evidence
that apply in court proceedings are not controlling in adminis-
trative hearings.14 No criticism is here advanced with respect
to this principle, but it is suggested that, in the public interest
as well as in the interest of those whom it regulates, the admin-
istrative agency should exercise what might be described as a
liberal discretion with respect to the evidence to be received. It
would seem obvious that mere rumor and surmise should be
excluded, but except for this it is difficult to offer specific sug-
gestions: perhaps in the present stage of the situation it is
enough to say that the agency should not be arbitrary in what
it admits or rejects. This vague and general principle would
grow in definiteness with the passage of time.
Mr. Walter F. Dodd suggests the following as the essential
elements of proper administrative procedure:
13. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R. (1913)
227 U. S. 88, at 91; The Chicago Junction Case (1924) 264 U. S. 258, at
263, 264, 265; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. (1924) 265 U. S.
274, at 288. In addition to its other disadvantages, the practice sought to
be justified by the Interstate Commerce Commission left uncertain just
what the record before it consisted of--on just what evidence it based its
decision.
14. See, e. g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. Dept. of Public Works (1925)
268 U. S. 39, at 44; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States (1930) 280
U. S. 420, at 442.
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(1) The administrative body must have acted within its
authority, that is, within the powers conferred upon it and
in the manner provided by law;
(2) There must be notice and an opportunity to be heard;
(3) There must be a "reasonable opportunity to know the
claims of the opposing party and to meet them";
(4) A finding may not be based on undisclosed facts;
(5) The procedure must be consistent with the essentials
of a fair trial;
(6) The findings must be based on "substantial evidence"
and must not be arbitrary and capricious;
(7) "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor" or a mere
scintilla of evidence do not suffice, but there must be "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion."' 1
To these might be added the opportunity to examine and cross-
examine witnesses ;16 for to the experienced lawyer this seems a
prerequisite of a real investigation-the possibility of being sub-
jected to cross-examination is probably a better safeguard
against false testimony than the risk of an indictment for per-
jury. It would be secured by the bill pending in Congress which
is being supported by the American Bar Association.
It is difficult to believe that the propriety of these character-
istics of a fair hearing can be questioned on any sound grounds;
-and yet many of them are absent from the procedure that ob-
tains before the United States Railroad Labor Board. And not
so many years ago one of the Interstate Commerce Commission-
ers was suggesting that that tribunal should be empowered to fix
rates without a hearing, leaving the railroads to contest their
legality after they had been ordered into effect. Something of
the sort was actually attempted in the so-called Dennison Act,1
but the Supreme Court 18 interpreted its provisions as requiring
a method of administration which afforded a hearing prior to
the forcing of rates into effect.
The right to a hearing is obviously limited to a person having
a legal right to assert; and so, in a matter such as the right to
issue securities, unless a statute specifically created a right to
15. Administrative Agencies as Legislators and Judges (1939) 25 A. B.
A. J. 923, 974.
16. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R. (1913)
227 U. S. 88, at 93.
17. (1924) '43 Stat. 360, c. 243, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 153.
18. United States v. Illinois Central R. R. (1934) 291 U. S. 457.
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be heard, it would seem that no such right would exist on the
part of anyone other than the corporation proposing to issue
the securities--except, perhaps, in unusual cases where some
security holder of the corporation might be able to establish a
legal status to object. Therefore, unless such a claim should be
interposed and should be found adequately supported, a hearing
would not be necessary as a condition precedent to the authori-
zation of the issuance of securities by the Commission, although,
if the corporation demanded it, it would seem obvious that a
hearing would have to be granted.
An important question also arises with reference to the stage
at which a hearing can be demanded. Manifestly, a public utility
is entitled to a hearing with respect to the reasonableness of its
charges; but this right is not believed to prevent an adminis-
trative agency from suspending a proposed change in charges
pending a hearing. In other words, the Interstate Commerce
Commission can interpose its suspension power prior to the ef-
fectiveness of rates that the railroads may publish, without
granting them a hearing as to whether such tariff should or
should not be suspended, even though this action on its part may
involve a substantial loss to the railroads; but it must later ac-
cord a hearing as to the propriety of the proposed changes before
they are finally condemned.
That such administrative action may be taken without a prior
hearing is further illustrated by the cases like Lawton v. Steele,19
which have permitted the state, in the exercise of its police
power, to take summary action to protect the public health and
safety where the surrounding conditions indicate necessity for
prompt action and where safeguards are provided to compensate
the person whose property is summarily taken or destroyed, if
it later proves that such action was not justified.
It seems that a more serious question is whether the Commis-
sion can condemn existing rates before a full hearing has been
accorded,20 and sundry difficulties are presented by the so-called
temporary rate power which is granted to some of the State
Commissions. It is too early to attempt to outline with confidence
19. (1894) 152 U. S. 133. See also North American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago (1908) 211 U. S. 306; Adams v. Milwaukee (1913) 228 U. S. 572;
and cf. Southern Ry. v. Virginia (1933) 290 U. S. 190.
20. See supra, note 16.
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to what extent such power may be exercised, but it seems reason-
ably certain that, at the least, there must be safeguards giving
reasonable assurance that the public utility will be allowed to.
recoup such losses as the temporary rate order may entail upon
it if, in its final decision, the Commission finds that the tempo-
rary reduction was improvident.21
When the administrative tribunal has acted there should be
some procedure available whereby a judicial tribunal can con-
sider whether it should stay the operation of the order until it
has had an opportunity to consider it in regular course, provided
it can be made to appear, prima facie, that the administrative
tribunal has disregarded the limitations of its authority or denied
a fair and adequate hearing. It is not intended to suggest that
the granting of the stay should be treated as a matter of course,
but only that there should be procedure available so that the pro-
tection may be invoked in proper cases.
In view of what has been said at the outset concerning the
personnel of administrative agencies, it is manifest that an im-
portant by-product of the fair and adequate hearings which seem
obviously appropriate on other grounds is that the administra-
tive officers may be educated in the details of their duties and,
with the passage of time, come to possess the expertness in the
handling of their responsibilities, the theoretical existence of
which is one of the reasons underlying their authority.22
Clearly, the Supreme Court is right in its emphasis on the
proposition that no particular form of procedure is required. It
is the substance that matters. The "basic concepts of fair play"
must be observed. It may well be that variety is desirable, both
to insure procedure adapted to the particular administrative
agency, and to obtain the advantage of experiment with different
forms of procedure.
A phase of administrative procedure that deserves considera-
tion is the rule-making authority, 23 the power to formulate and
21. See in this connection, Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.
(1923) 262 U. S. 43; Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co. (1939) 307
U. S. 104; Bronx Gas and Electric Co. v. Maltbie (1936) 271 N. Y. 364.
22. The customary description of the Interstate Commerce Commission
as "appointed by law and informed by experience," Illinois Central R. R.
v. I. C. C. (1907) 206 U. S. 441, at 454, has come to be the theoretical
basis for the respect with which it is suggested the decisions of adminis-
trative tribunals generally should be regarded.
23. See as to this general subject, Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative
Rule-Making (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 259.
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prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of the
statute establishing the administrative agency. In its simpler
form this is little more than a power to announce in advance
of decision in contested cases the conclusions of the agency as
to what, in its opinion, certain provisions of the statute require,
or the ritual that it will follow in the discharge of its statutory
duties; but it may easily develop a tendency in the agency to
constitute itself a miniature legislature, as it were, and to supply
what it conceives to be the deficiencies of the statute.24 This last
is in conflict with the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative
power, 25 and is of doubtful wisdom, to say the least, since prac-
tically every governmental body seeks to expand the scope of its
power, and hence cannot safely be made the judge of that
power's extent. As to the rule-making power in its simpler as-
pect, the principal procedural questions seem to be whether the
agency should accord hearings before formulating its rules and
regulations and whether its conclusions should be limited to rules
and regulations supported by the record so made. As a practical
matter, such a requirement seems of doubtful wisdom, provided
in any litigated case the record must be as complete as though
such rule or regulation had not been made. There are practical
advantages in the promulgation of rules and regulations, 28 but
in a general hearing the interests of those who are regulated may
be too remote to insure their participation.
Furthermore, the rules and regulations so promulgated may
lack the practical character that is more likely to be found in
those developed as a product of concrete controversies. At the
same time, when later the controversy arises to which a rule or
regulation is sought to be applied-i. e., a rule or regulation be-
gotten and born in vacuo, as it were-the person affected may
well believe that his rights should be determined under the statute
and upon the evidence then introduced of record.
Special consideration should be given the important class of
proceedings that result from the power entrusted to many ad-
ministrative agencies to initiate proceedings before themselves,
24. As for example, under the so-called Henry VIII clauses.
25. Unless founded on some report to the legislature setting forth the
rules and regulations proposed to be established, where such report is not
disapproved by the legislature. Cf. Walter F. Dodd, Administrative Agencies
as Legislators and Judges (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 923, 925-929.
26. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 68-71.
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and consider in such proceedings the remedial action to be
adopted within the ambit of the agency's authority. This proce-
dure is frequently criticised as making the agency a judge in
its own cause. On the other hand, one of the objectives usually
sought when administrative agencies are created is the estab-
lishment of machinery that will function of itself, as it were,
in the accomplishment of the statutory purposes and without
necessitating the interested member or members of the commu-
nity assuming the burden. -This objective may be a natural one,
but it is attended by the handicap of impairing the fairness of
the proceeding. This is especially so because such proceedings
are seldom initiated until after the agency has satisfied itself
through an ex parte investigation of its own that some definite
remedy should be invoked.2 7 The proceeding then begun, while
ostensibly an investigation, is in reality in many cases a forum
for the purpose of ratifying conclusions reached after the ex
parte investigation, and there is little chance of unbiased con-
sideration of the issues presented.
It is not without significance that the Morgan case28 was of
the class initiated by the administrative agency itself. As a prac-
tical matter this helps to explain the tendency of the Secretary
of Agriculture to regard his own methods of procedure as ade-
quate, and the difficulty of the Court's entertaining the same
opinion. The naive suggestion on behalf of the Secretary that
the proceeding before him "was not of an adversary character,
as it was not upon complaint but was initiated as a general in-
quiry" 29 only serves to show, as the Supreme Court indicated, the
Secretary's lack of clear understanding of the function in which
he was engaged, and his failure to afford those whose business
he undertook to regulate a more precise statement of that of
which he complained.
If these investigations initiated by administrative agencies
before themselves are to continue a recognized part of adminis-
trative procedure, emphasis is added to the importance of judi-
cial review in order to make certain that the zeal of the admin-
istrative officer does not blind him to "the rudimentary require-
ments of fair play."' ' 0
27. See Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 94-95.
28. Morgan v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 468; (1938) 304 U. S. 1.
29. 304 U. S. at 20.
30. 304 U. S. at 15.
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On turning to this controversial subject of judicial review, it
seems only proper to recall that there is no reason to assume
that administrative officials have been trained for the highly im-
portant and responsible duties they are to perform, or that they
have had experience in the questions that they will be called on
to decide, or that they have been disciplined in the analysis and
dissection of difficult problems so as to have acquired a proper
perspective or a sense of the more important and the less im-
portant factors of disputed issues. Nor are they guided by a
wealth of prior experience recorded in decisions relating to simi-
lar situations: the rule of stare decisis plays a very limited part
with administrative agencies. The monetary stakes involved in
the cases handled by administrative tribunals are frequently
enormous; and it is by no means unusual that these controversies,
while primarily financial, have other aspects of great importance
to the community. The result is that "enterprises of great pith
and moment" are, from time to time, subjected to the authority
of those whose interests lie in political directions and who are
not even amateurs as to the questions they undertake to decide.
But, "drest in a little brief authority," they are nevertheless en-
trusted with the power of decision.
It is believed that this feature of the situation is too often
overlooked and that problems of administrative authority and
judicial review of administrative action are discussed on the
basis of academic assumptions that do not coincide with the facts
as to the character of the administrative agencies. While pro-
tection is afforded to some extent by experienced staffs, the mem-
bers of such staffs are by no means universally secure in their
tenure of office; and, in addition, are seldom persons of that
degree of education and experience which may reasonably be
expected of persons given the power to make the important deci-
sions within the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Further-
more, the laws creating these administrative agencies contem-
plate the making of the decisions by the administrative officers
and not by their subordinates, and it would be an obvious breach
of the intention and purpose of such legislation if the adminis-
trator's name is merely used as a cover for the decisions of other
people.31 There would be few lawyers willing to agree that the
31. Cf. Morgan v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 468, at 481.
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decisions of the courts should be, in reality, the decisions of the
judges' secretaries but given the desired status and respectability
by the affixing of the judges' names.
Nor is the risk of an erroneous decision something of conse-
quence only to the public utility or to others who are subjected
to the authority of administrative officers. In many instances
the reach of administrative decisions goes far beyond that. Take
as an illustration the controversy over the so-called port differ-
entials between the eastern seaboard cities, referred to above.
Any one of these cities, New York, Boston, Philadelphia or Balti-
more will vouch the importance of this issue to their commer-
cial interests wholly apart from the question as to whether the
rates are high or low. In similar fashion, whether new railroad
construction shall be permitted involves interests extending far
beyond those of the railroad proposing the construction.
All this is not said for the purpose of suggesting by implica-
tion that administrative officers should be lawyers. It may well
be doubted whether lawyers make the best type of administra-
tive officials. But the significant fact is that there is no assur-
ance that the administrative official, prior to his selection, has
had any training or experience which fits him to interpret the
law under which he acts or to perform the highly important and
difficult duties that will fall to his lot. In the case of the Inter-
state Commerce Act and almost any state commission statute the
law that has accumulated is of substantial volume and intricacy,
so that it not a simple thing for a successful business man, or a
competent engineer or even a newspaper man, to become, in a
short space of time, an efficient administrative officer.
In these circumstances it seems manifest that decisions of
such agencies should not be conclusive. Presumably the public
does not wish the agency to go beyond the mandate it has- given
it or to apply standards other than those prescribed. Presum-
ably also the public desires that procedure shall be fair and that
a real hearing shall be accorded. Some one must decide whether
the mandate of the public has been adhered to. Who shall do
this?
It is obvious that it cannot be left to the final decision of the
administrative agency itself. No public official can safely be
trusted to determine the boundaries of his own authority-cer-
tainly that has been the accepted theory in American institu-
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tions. The tendency to expand the field of one's authority is too
well known to require discussion. The situations in which ad-
ministrative agencies or officials have recommended a diminu-
tion of their authority are negligible: on the contrary, there is a
perennial recommendation for additional power.32
Furthermore, in many instances the question which deter-
mines the validity of the action of the administrative agency is
whether it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Can there be any doubt
as to the propriety of entrusting the determination of this ques-
tion to some one other than the person or persons whose action
is challenged? Is it possible to refer to any occasion on which
an administrative or other public officer has formally found his
conduct to be arbitrary?
If, then, it is only fair and in the public interest that there
should be some opportunity to have a determination as to whether
the administrative agency has kept within the boundaries of its
authority and has accorded a fair and adequate hearing to those
who are to be affected by its decision, it seems to follow that such
determination should be made by an independent agency-an
agency having no other purpose to subserve than to decide these
questions with complete impartiality. Obviously, the only agency
answering this description is the judicial arm of the government.
Perhaps the propriety of judicial review is conceded-most
decisions of courts of first instance are subject to some form of
review-and possibly the bitterness of the present controversy
centers in the question as to what should be the scope of that
review. Here there is room for real difference of opinion, and
it may be that that difference of opinion grows out of an under-
lying difference of theory as to whether the functioning of ad-
ministrative agencies should be accepted as a normal and proper
feature of present-day governmental operations, or should be
opposed. Those who entertain the first point of view seek to
32. If it be suggested that these same considerations apply to judges, it
is to be remembered that the court of first instance is, in the great majority
of cases, subject to correction by some appellate tribunal, and that the
appellate tribunal, by the very nature of its position, has a relatively limited
field in which it might seek to expand its authority-with few exceptions,
it could do so only in the cases appealed to it. Moreover, each court has,
in prior decisions, a much more definite chart for its guidance-vague as
that chart may be in many particulars-than has the administrative agency.
Furthermore, the court is not confessedly seeking to promote some govern-
mental policy other than the administration of justice.
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limit the scope of court review, while those who dislike adminis-
trative agencies urge a broad scope of review.
So far as this discussion is concerned, the belief that underlies
it is that these agencies constitute an established and indeed
necessary part of modern governmental activity and that every
reasonable effort should be made to promote their successful
functioning. From this it would follow that the courts should
not undertake to assume to review the strictly administrative
issue decided by the administrative agency, but should limit
themselves to a decision as to the two matters several times
referred to, viz., (a) whether the administrative agency has kept
within the boundaries of the authority conferred upon it, and
(b) whether it has accorded those who are to be affected by its
decision a fair and adequate hearing. It will be noted that these
issues are of a kind which the courts, by virtue of their training
and experience, should be especially qualified to decide.
In outlining the classes of questions that the courts may prop-
erly consider in passing on the validity of orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, the Supreme Court of the United
States, some years ago, said :3
There has been no attempt to make an exhaustive state-
ment of the principle involved, but in cases thus far decided,
it has been settled that the orders of the Commission are
final unless (1) beyond the power which it could constitu-
tionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3)
based upon a mistake of law. But questions of fact may be
involved in the determination of questions of law, so that
an order, regular on its face, may be set aside if it appears
that (4) the rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in viola-
tion of the constitutional prohibition against taking prop-
erty without due process of law; or (5) if the Commission
acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to
evidence, or without evidence to support it; or (6) if the
authority therein involved has been exercised in such an
unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the ele-
mentary rule that the substance, and not the shadow, deter-
mines the validity of the exercise of the power.
It is clear that in the second set of cases here described there
will be difficulty in deciding precisely where the line lies between
what is properly reviewable and what is not. Facts are involved;
33. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. (1912) 222,
U. S. 541, at 547.
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and, when that is the case, the appraisal of their significance and
relative importance opens the door for many differences of opin-
ion. And yet it seems impossible to exclude such cases from judi-
cial examination: otherwise it is quite easy to "keep the promise
to the ear and break it to the hope." A commission may order
a rate reduced on the ostensible ground that it is too high and
therefore unreasonable, when its real reason may be to balance
economic or geographical advantage, to oblige a potential mem-
ber of the party in power, or to strengthen itself in popular esti-
mation. Such motives are not wholly unknown, and the possi-
bility that they may be operating under cover acquires greater
danger because of the fact already alluded to, viz., that many
administrative standards are vague and indefinite and permit a
wide range of discretion in their application.
The provisions of the bill pending in Congress sponsored by
the American Bar Association with reference to administrative
procedure, are as follows:
Any decision of any agency or independent agency shall
be set aside if it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the
court (1) that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous;
or (2) that the findings of fact are not supported by sub-
stantial evidence; or (3) that the decision is not supported
by the findings of fact; or (4) that the decision was issued
without due notice and a reasonable opportunity having
been afforded the aggrieved party for a full and fair hear-
ing; or (5) that the decision is beyond the jurisdiction of
the agency or independent agency, as the case may be; or
(6) that the decision infringes the Constitution or statutes
of the United States; or (7) that the decision is otherwise
contrary to law.
While the phraseology differs from that quoted from the Su-
preme Court's opinion with reference to Interstate Commerce
Commission orders, there is substantial similarity in substance.
Debate will arise as to what is meant by "substantial evidence,"
and whether the word "substantial" is superfluous. Its fair sig-
nificance would seem to be that the conclusion sought to be
drawn is reasonably permissible-not an arbitrary one; but pos-
sibly the fear is that it may be laid hold of for a more drastic
review of the administrative determination than many persons
would wish to see.
It is believed that a more serious question is presented by the
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proposed implied requirement that the decision be supported by
"the findings of fact," since this would apparently require a cer-
tain form of procedure; and, while much may be said in favor
of this form of procedure, it may be doubted whether it should
be embodied in a statutory requirement, especially since there
is great variety in the powers granted to the various adminis-
trative agencies that may ultimately become subject to this law.
It is submitted that the scope of judicial review may well be
prescribed in somewhat general terms, at least for the time be-
ing. These administrative agencies are of wide variety not only
in their functions but in the character of their personnel. The
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission are not easily
upset in the courts.3 4 The fact that this may not be true of some
administrative agencies with less experience, with no similar
traditions of independence and fairness, with a greater inclina-
tion to act summarily and without careful investigation, obvi-
ously suggests that one of the most effective methods to pro-
mote the finality of administrative action is for the administra-
tive agency itself to be scrupulously fair in its procedure. They
are supposed to be "informed by experience." If they are not
really so, the foundation for supporting their decisions is
shaken.35 As the Supreme Court said in the second Morgan
case:3r- "If these multiplying agencies deemed to be necessary
in our complex society are to serve the purposes for which they
are created and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit
themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished judicial
tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play."3 7
34. Judge Hough, formerly of the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, is reported to have said: "When I have before
me a case for review from the Interstate Commerce Commission, almost
instinctively I want to sustain their order. When I have before me a case
to review of the Federal Trade Commission, almost instinctively I want to
reverse it." Quoted by Professor (now Mr. Justice) Frankfurter (1938)
12 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 271-272.
35. Cf. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 143-144, 153.
36. (1938) 304 U. S. at 22.
37. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Federal Communica-
tions Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 437, seems
not to be at variance with these general suggestions. Thus Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in his opinion, says:
To be sure, the laws under which these agencies operate prescribe the
fundamentals of fair play. They require that interested parties be
afforded an opportunity for hearing and that judgment must express
a reasoned conclusion. * * *
* * * To lay the basis for review here, Congress amended §16 so
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As such a policy becomes more prevalent-as is believed cer-
tain to come about-the frequency of judicial action adverse to
the conclusions of administrative agencies will become steadily
less, and the matter of judicial review will gradually solve itself
by being reduced to cases in which its propriety will be more and
more generally conceded.:
While it is believed that judicial review must be allowed, both
with respect to the question as to the administrative agency's
obedience to the statute under which it operates, and to the ade-
quacy of the hearing accorded to those interested, it is clear that
the procedure for such review should be simple and speedy and
that the reviewing judicial tribunal should move with special
care in those cases where the contention is that the evidence has
been disregarded and that the administrative agency has been
guilty of sacrificing the substance to the shadow. The court's
function in such cases resembles its function in dealing with a
verdict of a jury.
These administrative agencies constitute the mechanism which
the people are seeking to use in their efforts to grapple with
problems created by the increasing complexity of our modern
economic life. They are instruments of power, having within
themselves the possibility of great public good, but also the possi-
bility of public evil. As time has passed the people have found
it necessary, for the maintenance of their liberty, to hedge gov-
ernmental power with various restrictions. The early amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution disclose an interesting sum-
mary, for the most part, of the successive victories won by the
as to terminate the administrative oversight of the Court of Appeals.
c. 788, 46 Stat. 844. In "sharp contrast with the previous grant of
authority" the court was restricted to a purely judicial review.
"Whether the Commission applies the legislative standards validly set
up, whether it acts within the authority conferred or goes beyond it,
whether its proceedings satisfy the pertinent demands of due process,
whether, in short, there is compliance with the legal requirements
which fix the province of the Commission and govern its action, are
appropriate questions for judicial decision." Federal Radio Comm'n
v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 276.
38. In an address before the Association of Practitioners before the
Interstate Commerce Commission at Pittsburgh in October, 1938, Mr. Com-
missioner Aitchison said:
"And the prophecy may be ventured that, with the aid of existing
powers of judicial review, public opinion and the pride of every administra-
tive agency in having its determinations sustained will suffice to bring
abozt any needed correction."
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people in their struggle against the abuse of governmental power.
So also, some restrictions will inevitably attend this developing
form of governmental activity.
The administrative agencies are relatively new with us, or per-
haps it is more accurate to say that the rapidly increasing growth
of their use is a recent matter. In this discussion an effort has
been made to indicate the problems to which they give rise, espe-
cially because of the methods by which administrative officers
are customarily selected, and also because of the vagueness that
in so many cases characterizes the standards they are authorized
to apply. This vagueness creates an unusual opportunity for the
influence of personal inclination, and a range of discretion which,
at the best, makes the decision depend on factors as illogical as
the relation of the length of the chancellor's foot to his con-
science. It is attended with the ancient danger of a government
of men in lieu of a government of laws, a danger perhaps more
fully apparent today, in view of recent happenings, than a year
ago. The United States of America has developed in the belief
that a government of men as opposed to a government of laws
is not conducive to the maintenance of liberty. So, while the pro-
cedure that should be insisted on to safeguard the great interests
that are entrusted to administrative agencies should be such as
to give them full opportunity to function effectively, it should,
at the same time, provide a method of requiring them to keep
within the authority that the people have given them and to
accord a fair hearing to those who are to be affected by their
decisions.
The two objectives of the administrative agency are efficiency
in carrying out the governmental purpose and fairness in the
attainment of this end. Their ever-present problem is to main-
tain a proper balance between these two objectives. By doing
so they will grow in public usefulness and, at the same time, be
properly integrated with our other democratic institutions.
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